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–Trade unions are expected to represent the interests of the entire workforce at both 
sectoral level and company level. Under threat of outsourcing, downsizing and increasing 
competitive pressure, workers’ representatives sometimes agree to concessions at 
workplace level at the expense of the peripheral workforce (e.g. fixed-term workers, 
agency workers) in order to protect the jobs and/or working conditions of the core 
workforce. Existing research has shown that this is not a sustainable bargaining strategy because the increasing presence of 
‘second-class’ workers in workplaces also undermines, in the long run, the standards of the core workforce. Unions therefore 
need to take steps, through organising and bargaining activities, to include peripheral workers in their constituencies. In 
particular, unions are invited to set a common bargaining floor across companies and to engage actively with workplace 
representatives to prevent concessions from being agreed at the expense of the marginal workforce. 
 Policy recommendations
Introduction
The increasing pressure on labour costs, the threat of outsourcing 
to cheaper locations, and the progressive decentralisation of 
collective bargaining, have contributed to the spread of concession 
bargaining at workplace level across Europe (e.g. Pulignano 2006; 
Greer and Hauptmeier 2015). While this practice was initially used 
to deal with organisational or economic crises requiring short-
term employment-restructuring, it has now become a common 
instrument of co-management and its outcomes include provisions 
– e.g. longer shifts and lower wage levels – that will continue 
to affect the workforce in the longterm. In order to protect the 
core workforce from deteriorating wages and working conditions, 
labour representatives have sometimes agreed on concessions 
regarding the employment of workers through subcontractors 
or staff agencies at lower wages and working conditions (e.g. 
Doerflinger and Pulignano 2015). 
This Policy Brief argues that this is not a sustainable strategy 
because concession bargaining at the expense of the peripheral 
workforce contributes to inequalities between different workforce 
groups, while serving to undermine also, in the longer run, the 
wages and working conditions of core workers. The focus here is the 
campaign on agency work conducted by the German metalworkers’ 
union IG Metall. The Policy Brief will highlight the strategies used 
in this campaign by unions in an effort to reverse the downward 
wage spiral and to set sectoral and national standards that cover the 
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workforce as a whole. Their success in this respect was dependent on 
their ability to (re)gain control of workplace bargaining by shoring 
up bargaining at sectoral level, as labour can be more easily put 
under pressure at workplace level through the threat of outsourcing 
or plant closure. At the same time, union representatives and 
works councillors engaged in recruiting and bargaining initiatives 
dedicated to agency workers. 
The empirical evidence derives mainly from fieldwork conducted in 
the German metal sector between 2011 and 2013. The findings derive 
from interviews with works councillors and union representatives 
in the German automotive and machine tool building sector. More 
detailed findings have been published in Benassi and Dorigatti 
2015 and in Benassi 2015. 
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Increasing pressure on works 
councils: decentralised bargaining and 
deregulation 
In the German manufacturing sector concession bargaining on 
wages and working conditions has become increasingly widespread 
in the last fifteen years. From a policy perspective the German metal 
sector is a relevant case for studying concession bargaining and its 
consequences for workers and the bargaining power of labour: in 
view of Germany’s export successes despite the recent economic 
crisis, policy makers and academics have suggested the possibility 
of transferring its industrial relations system to Southern European 
countries (e.g. Dustmann et al. 2014). However, as some studies 
suggest, the competitiveness of the German export model has up 
to now depended also on concessions at sectoral and workplace 
level – at the expense of both the core and the peripheral workforces 
– which have contributed to a compression of labour costs (Hassel 
2014; Dustmann et al. 2014). 
Over the last twenty years the German collective bargaining 
system has become increasingly decentralised. Membership of 
the employers’ associations has been declining in the last twenty 
years, leading to erosion of the collective bargaining coverage rate 
in both the manufacturing and the services sector (Bispinck and 
Schulten 2014). In addition, opening clauses have spread since 
the beginning of the 1990s, serving to amend the working time 
and wage provisions of sectoral agreements. Such clauses were 
initially a response to the request for more flexibility from German 
(manufacturing) employers who were facing financial difficulties due 
to the collapse of the East German economy and the economic crisis 
in Western Germany. Even though these agreements were initially 
legitimised as responses to exceptional economic situations and 
covered a maximum period of three years, since the late 1990s they 
have become an institutionalised instrument of co-management 
and contain long-term provisions aimed at preventing outsourcing 
and downsizing of German production sites. These agreements 
usually include concessions on wages, working time and other 
aspects of working conditions, as well as the use of temporary 
work and subcontractors. 
IG Metall tried to retain control over workplace bargaining through 
the Pforzheim agreement (2004), according to which union 
representatives were required to be present during negotiations 
between management and works councils on provisions amending 
the sectoral agreements. Even so, employers’ use of the marginal 
workforce in the workplace, e.g. temporary workers and agency 
workers, remained difficult to control especially after the Hartz 
reforms of 2003. These labour market reforms deregulated the use 
of agency work as they allowed the hiring of workers on agency 
contractswithoutjustification for such non-standard contracts, and 
lifted any obligation to hire permanently after a certain period of 
time. Furthermore, the reforms allowed the amendment of the equal 
pay principle by collective agreements, which indeed set wages at a 
lower level in the agency sector than in the metal sector. As a result, 
in 1996 45% of companies in core manufacturing sectors employed, 
on average, 2% of their workforce on agency contracts and by 2008, 
before the crisis, the rate of the companies doubled and agency 
workers constituted on average 8% of the company workforce. 
In spite of this still relatively low average, in some companies 
the percentage of agency workers has risen as high as 20-30%. 
Bargaining decentralisation and labour market deregulation placed 
works councils under great pressure for concessions. Until the mid-
2000s many company-level agreements included provisions that 
reinforced segmentation between different categories of permanent 
workers and contingent workers in terms of working time (e.g. 
overtime and unsocial working hours) and pay (e.g. no access to 
company-level bonuses and benefits).
Reversing the trend: The IG Metall 
campaign on agency work
The attitude of works councils and unions towards agency workers 
started to change a few years after implementation of the Hartz 
reforms. The increase in recourse to agency work challenged works 
councils when it began to undermine their ability to set standards 
on wages and working conditions for the core workforce within 
the company. Employers benchmarked the performance of agency 
workers against the performance of permanent workers in order 
to question the wage level set by collective agreements insofar as 
agency workers were performing similarly to permanent workers but 
were being paid lower rates. Furthermore, the increasing presence 
of agency workers limited the potential for labour mobilisation 
because, first, core workers are afraid of being replaced and, 
secondly, it is difficult to organise agency workers to go on strike. 
Finally, the intensive use of agency work reduces the overall impact 
of strikes as it can mean that work stoppages are prevented.
While until 2008 the responsibility for regulating agency work laid 
with works councils, their success in this respect was limited. It was 
for this reason that IG Metall started the ‘Same work same wage’ 
campaign for the purpose of recruiting agency workers into the 
union and, at the same time, setting a common bargaining floor 
across companies regarding the employment conditions of agency 
workers. The campaign was aimed at raising awareness about 
agency work among works councillors and union members. It also 
sought to gain the support of public opinion and therefore included 
informative billboards on the wage gap between agency workers 
and regular employees, as well as a postcard action campaignfor 
better regulation of agency work, aimed at lobbying the members 
of local and national parliaments. Above all, IG Metall actively 
pushed for bargaining with employers in order to achieve equal pay 
for agency workers and to introduce limitations on the possibilities 
of renewing agency contracts. 
The campaign produced positive results. At company level works 
councils achieved agreements gaining better working conditions for 
agency workers and by 2011 over 1,200 companies were covered 
by such agreements. Furthermore, by 2012 over 50,000 agency 
workers had joined the union. In the collective bargaining arena, 
an industry-wide agreement on equal pay for agency workers 
was signed in September 2010 in the steel sector, followed, after 
less than two years, by a collective agreement for the metal and 
electronics industry. This agreement strengthened co-determination 
rights in the hiring companies, enabling works councils to bargain 
with management over the reasons for hiring agency workers and 
the length of assignment. Moreover, it made the permanent hiring 
of agency workers compulsory after 24 months (though encouraged 
3restructuring in countries with strong sectoral bargaining institutions 
– e.g. Austria and Sweden – did not have negative effects in terms 
of pay on either core or peripheral workers because employers could 
not exit existing institutions. Furthermore, at the Italian former 
monopolist Telecom Italia (TI) unions played a decisive role in 
improving low-end working conditions by adopting proactive and 
inclusive strategies towards the workers on precarious contracts 
in subsidiaries and subcontractors. Indeed, the subsidiaries and 
subcontractors of TI employed, on freelance and agency contracts, 
workers who had lower wages and working conditions than the 
core workforce. The Italian unions managed to shift most of these 
workers on to standard contracts, while at the same time managing 
to avoid concessions about wages and working conditions of the 
core workforce.
Conclusion 
The increasing pressure to compress labour costs, together with 
the erosion of sectoral bargaining and deregulation of the labour 
market, have frequently pushed labour representatives at workplace 
level to agree on concessions at the expense of marginal workforce 
segments. However, evidence has shown that this strategy is not 
sustainable because employers can, in the longer run, use the 
marginal workforce in order to obtain concessions on the wages 
and working conditions of the core workforce. For this reason, 
unions should take active steps to counter labour market dualisation 
by extending their representation boundaries in order to take in 
marginal workers and by re-establishing strong sectoral collective 
agreements setting standards and limitations regarding the 
employment of contingent workers. 
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